the designs of Spain and the League.

"We wish to know," he said in answer to the affectionate messages and
fine promises of the King of Spain to James as reported by Caron, "what
his Majesty of Great Britain has done, is doing, and is resolved to do
for the Duke of Savoy and the Republic of Venice. If they ask you what we
are doing, answer that we with our forces and vigour are keeping off from
the throats of Savoy and Venice 2000 riders and 10,000 infantry, with
which forces, let alone their experience, more would be accomplished than
with four times the number of new troops brought to the field in Italy.
This is our succour, a great one and a very costly one, for the expense
of maintaining our armies to hold the enemy in check here is very great."

He alluded with his usual respectful and quiet scorn to the arrangements
by which James so wilfully allowed himself to be deceived.

"If the Spaniard really leaves the duchies," he said, "it is a grave
matter to decide whether on the one side he is not resolved by that means
to win more over us and the Elector of Brandenburg in the debateable land
in a few days than he could gain by force in many years, or on the other
whether by it he does not intend despatching 1200 or 1500 cavalry and
5000 or 6000 foot, all his most experienced soldiers, from the
Netherlands to Italy, in order to give the law at his pleasure to the
Duke of Savoy and the Republic of Venice, reserving his attack upon
Germany and ourselves to the last. The Spaniards, standing under a
monarchical government, can in one hour resolve to seize to-morrow all
that they and we may abandon to-day. And they can carry such a resolution
into effect at once. Our form of government does not permit this, so that
our republic must be conserved by distrust and good garrisons."

Thus during this long period of half hostilities Barneveld, while
sincerely seeking to preserve the peace in Europe, was determined, if
possible, that the Republic should maintain the strongest defensive
position when the war which he foreboded should actually begin. Maurice
and the war party had blamed him for the obstacles which he interposed to
the outbreak of hostilities, while the British court, as we have seen,
was perpetually urging him to abate from his demands and abandon both the
well strengthened fortresses in the duchies and that strong citadel of
distrust which in his often repeated language he was determined never to
surrender. Spi