hief business of the
directing minds on either side to close by other troops as soon as
possible. Generally the call will be made upon the artillery for this
purpose, since they can cover the required distances far more rapidly
than infantry. Now, as artillery is powerless when limbered up and
always very vulnerable on the flanks of the long lines, a strong cavalry
escort will have to be assigned to them which, trotting forward to
screen the march, will either come in contact with the enemy's cavalry
advancing with a similar object, or themselves find an opportunity to
catch the enemy's guns at a disadvantage. These are opportunities for
the cavalry, and if necessary it must sacrifice itself to turn them to
the best account. The whole course of the battle depends on success or
failure in the early formation of great lines of guns, for ultimately
the victor in the artillery duel finds himself in command of the
necessary balance of guns which are needed to prepare the way for his
final decisive infantry attack. If this latter succeeds, then any
mounted men who can gallop and shoot will suffice for pursuit. If it
fails, no cavalry, however gallant, has any hope of definitely restoring
the combat, for against victorious infantry, cavalry, now as in the
past, can but gain a little time. This time may indeed be worth the
price at which it can be bought, but it will always be more economical
to concentrate all efforts to prevent the emergency arising.

After the Franco-German War much was written about the possibility of
vast cavalry encounters to be fought far in advance of the main armies,
for the purpose of obtaining information, and ideas were freely mooted
of wide-flung raids traversing the enemy's communications, breaking up
his depots, reserve formations, &c. But riper consideration has
relegated these suggestions to the background, for it is now evident
that such expeditions involve the dissemination of force, not its
concentration. Austria and France for example would scarcely throw their
numerically inferior cavalry against the Germans, and nothing would suit
them better than that the latter should hurl their squadrons against the
frontier guards, advanced posts, and, generally, against unbeaten
infantry; nor indeed would the Germans stultify their whole strategic
teaching by weakening themselves for the decisive struggle. It follows
therefore that cavalry reconnaissance duties will be strictly local and
tactical, an