, which with 11 st. for the man brings the total to 16
st.; add to this the lightest possible saddle, bridle, cloak and
blanket, and 17 st. 8 lb. is approximately the irreducible minimum. It
may be imagined what care and management of the horses is required to
enable them under such loads to manoeuvre in masses at a trot, and
gallop for distances of 5 m. and upwards without a moment for
dismounting.

_Reconnaissance and Scouting._--After 1870 public opinion, misled by the
performances of the "ubiquitous Uhlan" and disappointed by the absence
of great cavalry charges on the field of battle, came somewhat hastily
to the conclusion that the day of "shock tactics" was past and the
future of cavalry lay in acting as the eyes and ears of the following
armies. But, as often happens, the fact was overlooked that the German
cavalry screen was entirely unopposed in its reconnoitring expeditions,
and it was not till long afterwards that it became apparent how very
little these far-flung reconnaissances had contributed to the total
success.

It has been calculated by German cavalry experts that not 1% of the
reports sent in by the scouts during the advance from the Saar to the
Meuse, August 1870, were of appreciable importance to the headquarters,
and that before the orders based upon this evidence reached the front,
events frequently anticipated them. Generally the conviction has
asserted itself, that it is impossible to train the short-service
soldiers of civilized nations sufficiently to render their reports worth
the trouble of collating, and if a few cases of natural aptitude do
exist nothing can ensure that these particular men should be
sufficiently well mounted to transmit their information with sufficient
celerity to be of importance. It is of little value to a commander to
know that the enemy was at a given spot forty-eight hours previously,
unless the sender of the report has a sufficient force at his disposal
to compel the enemy to remain there; in other words, to attack and hold
him. Cavalry and horse artillery alone, however, cannot economically
exert this holding power, for, whatever their effect against worn-out
men at the close of a great battle, against fresh infantry they are
relatively powerless. Hence, it is probable that we shall see a revival
of the strategic advanced guard of all arms, as in the Napoleonic days,
which will not only reconnoitre, but fix the enemy until the army itself
can execute the manoeu