erous at the outbreak of future wars than they have been in the
past, because the enormous gain in range and rapidity of fire enables a
far greater weight of metal to be concentrated on any chosen area within
a given time. It cannot be too often reiterated that cavalry never has
ridden over unshaken infantry of average quality by reason of its
momentum alone, but that every successful cavalry charge has always owed
its issue to a previously acquired moral superiority which has prevented
the infantry from making adequate use of their means of defence. Nor
will such charges entail greater losses than in the past, for, great
though the increase of range of modern infantry weapons has been, the
speed and endurance of cavalry has increased in a yet higher ratio;
whereas in Napoleon's days, with an extreme range for musketry of 1000
yds., cavalry were expected only to trot 800 yds. and gallop for 200,
nowadays with an extreme infantry range of under 4000 yds., the cavalry
are trained to trot for 8000 yds. and gallop for 2000.

Neither the experiences in South Africa nor those in Manchuria seriously
influenced the views of the leading cavalry experts as above outlined,
for the conditions of both cases were entirely abnormal. No nation in
western Europe can afford to mount the whole of its able-bodied
manhood, nor, with the restricted area of its possessions, could repeat
the Boer tactics with useful effect; in Manchuria, the theatre of
operation was so far roadless, and the motives of both combatants so
distinct from any conceivable as a basis for European strategy, that
time was always available to construct entrenchments and obstacles
physically insuperable to mounted arms. In western Europe, with its
extreme development of communications, such tactics are impracticable,
and under the system of compulsory service which is in force in all
nations, an early decision must be sought at any cost. This motive
imposes a rapid-marching campaign in the Napoleonic style, and in such
warfare there is neither time nor energy available for the erection of
extemporised fortresses. Victory must therefore fall to the side that
can develop the greatest fire power in the shortest time. The greatest
factor of fire power is the long artillery lines, and as cavalry is the
one arm which by its mobility can hamper or prevent the formation of
such lines, on its success in this task all else must depend. Hence both
sides will concentrate every availa