ed by a narrow-minded and spoiled Empress. Court intrigues
were rife and drawing-room generals were to be found in real life, as
well as in Offenbach's "Grande Duchesse." But nobody, except perhaps
Napoleon himself, realized how the Empire had declined. The Empress
merely felt that it was time to do something stirring, and, without
necessarily waging war, to assert again the pre-eminence in Europe of
France, weakened in 1866 by the unexpected outcome of the rivalry
between Austria and Prussia for preponderance among the German States.

Beyond the eastern frontier of France a nation was growing in ambition
and power. Prussia still remembered the warlike achievements of
Frederick the Great, although since those days its military efficiency
had at times undergone a decline. But now, under the reign of King
William, guided by a vigorous minister, Bismarck, an example, whatever
his admirers may say, of the brutal and unscrupulous _Junker_, the
Prussian Government had for some time tried to impose its leadership on
the other German States. Some of these were far from anxious to accept
it. In the furtherance of Prussian schemes, Bismarck had been able to
inflict a diplomatic rebuff on Napoleon, as well as a severe military
defeat on Austria.

In 1866, Prussia won from Austria the important victory of Koeniggraetz or
Sadowa, and thereby asserted its leadership. The outcome was a check to
Napoleon, who had expected a different result. Moreover, by it Bismarck
was encouraged to pursue his plans for the consolidation of Germany
under a still more openly acknowledged Prussian supremacy. A crafty and
utterly unscrupulous diplomat, he was able to mislead Napoleon and his
unskilful ministers.

Soon after Sadowa the Emperor tried to obtain territorial compensation
from Prussia. He wished, in return for recognition of Prussia's new
position and of the projected union of North and South Germany minus
Austria, to obtain the cession of territories on the left bank of the
Rhine, or an alliance for the conquest and annexation of Belgium to
France. Such schemes having failed, Napoleon tried next to satisfy
French jingoism by the acquisition of the Duchy of Luxembourg. This move
resulted only in securing the evacuation by its Prussian garrison of the
Luxembourg fortress and the neutralization of the duchy. From that time
on, tension increased between France and Prussia. Bismarck was, indeed,
more anxious for war than Napoleon. He suspected t