e not only at peace, but in intimate alliance, with Sparta--the
sentence of banishment against Xenophon was revoked; so that the latter
part of his life was again passed in the enjoyment of his birthright as
an Athenian citizen and Knight.[122] Two of his sons, Gryllus and
Diodorus, fought among the Athenian horsemen at the cavalry combat which
preceded the battle of Mantineia, where the former was slain, after
manifesting distinguished bravery; while his grandson Xenophon became in
the next generation the subject of a pleading before the Athenian court
of justice, composed by the orator Deinarchus.

On bringing this accomplished and eminent leader to the close of that
arduous retreat which he had conducted with so much honor, I have
thought it necessary to anticipate a little on the future in order to
take a glance at his subsequent destiny. To his exile (in this point of
view not less useful than that of Thucydides) we probably owe many of
those compositions from which so much of our knowledge of Grecian
affairs is derived. But to the contemporary world, the retreat, which
Xenophon so successfully conducted, afforded a far more impressive
lesson than any of his literary compositions. It taught in the most
striking manner the impotence of the Persian land-force, manifested not
less in the generals than in the soldiers. It proved that the Persian
leaders were unfit for any systematic operations, even under the
greatest possible advantages, against a small number of disciplined
warriors resolutely bent on resistance; that they were too stupid and
reckless even to obstruct the passage of rivers, or destroy roads, or
cut off supplies. It more than confirmed the contemptuous language
applied to them by Cyrus himself, before the battle of Kunaxa; when he
proclaimed that he envied the Greeks their freedom, and that he was
ashamed of the worthlessness of his own countrymen. Against such perfect
weakness and disorganization, nothing prevented the success of the
Greeks along with Cyrus, except his own paroxysm of fraternal antipathy.
And we shall perceive hereafter the military and political leaders of
Greece--Agesilaus, Jason of Pherae, and others down to Philip and
Alexander[123]--firmly persuaded that with a tolerably numerous and
well-appointed Grecian force, combined with exemption from Grecian
enemies, they could succeed in overthrowing or dismembering the Persian
empire. This conviction, so important in the subsequent hist