s
with like infallibility all the movements of his army as far as Berlin,
the day of his entrance into that capital, and the appointment of the
governor whom he destined for it; he it was who, astonished in his turn,
was now in perplexity what course to pursue. Never had he communicated
his most daring projects to the most confidential of his ministers but
in order for their execution; he was now, however, constrained to
consult and put to the proof those who were around him.

But, in doing this, he still preserved the same show of confidence and
of determination. He declared that he would march for St. Petersburg.
This conquest was already marked out on his maps, hitherto so prophetic:
orders were even issued to the different corps to hold themselves in
readiness. But this was all only a feint: it was but a better face that
he strove to assume, or an expedient for diverting his grief at the loss
of Moscow; so that Berthier, and more especially Bessieres, soon
convinced him that he had neither time, provisions, roads, nor a single
requisite for so distant an expedition.

At this moment he was apprised that Kutusoff, after having fled towards
the east, had suddenly turned to the south, and thrown himself between
Moscow and Kaluga. This was an additional circumstance against the
expedition to St. Petersburg. There was a threefold reason for marching
upon the beaten army, and endeavoring to extinguish it: to secure his
right flank and his line of operation; to possess himself of Kaluga and
of Tula, the one the granary, the other the arsenal of Russia; and,
lastly, to open safe, short, new, and untouched retreat to Smolensk and
Lithuania.[151]

Some one proposed to return upon Wittgenstein and Witepsk.[152]
Napoleon, however, remained undecided between these different plans.
That for the conquest of St. Petersburg alone flattered him: the others
appeared but as ways of retreat, as acknowledgments of error; and
whether from pride, or policy which would not admit itself to be in the
wrong, he rejected them.

Besides, where was he to halt in case of a retreat? He had so fully
calculated on concluding a peace at Moscow, that he had no
winter-quarters provided in Lithuania. Kaluga had no temptations for
him. Wherefore lay waste fresh provinces? It would be wiser only to
threaten them, and thus leave the Russians something to lose, in order
to induce them to conclude a peace by which they might be preserved.
Would it be poss