skilfully constructed instrument? You picture the
muscles as hearkening to the commands sent through the motor nerves,
and you picture the sensor nerves as the vehicles of incoming
intelligence; are you not bound to supplement this mechanism by the
assumption of an entity which uses it? In other words, are you not
forced by Tour own exposition into the hypothesis of a free human
soul?

This is fair reasoning now, and at a certain stage of the world's
knowledge, it might well have been deemed conclusive. Adequate
reflection, however, shows that instead of introducing light into our
minds, this hypothesis considered scientifically increases our
darkness. You do not in this case explain the unknown in terms of the
known, which, as stated above, is the method of science, but you
explain the unknown in terms of the more unknown. Try to mentally
visualise this soul as an entity distinct from the body, and the
difficulty immediately appears. From the side of science all that we
are warranted in stating is that the terror, hope, sensation, and
calculation of Lange's merchant, are psychical phenomena produced by,
or associated with, the molecular processes set up by waves of light
in a previously prepared brain.

When facts present themselves let us dare to face them, but let the
man of science equally dare to confess ignorance where it prevails.
What then is the causal connection, if any, between the objective and
subjective--between molecular motions and states of consciousness? My
answer is: I do not see the connection, nor have I as yet met anybody
who does.

It is no explanation to say that the objective and subjective effects
are two sides of one and the same phenomenon. Why should the
phenomenon have two sides? This is the very core of the difficulty.
There are plenty of molecular motions which do not exhibit this
two-sidedness. Does water think or feel when it runs into frost-ferns
upon a window-pane? If not, why should the molecular motion of the
brain be yoked to this mysterious companion--consciousness? We can
form a coherent picture of the physical processes--the stirring of the
brain, the thrilling of the nerves, the discharging of the muscles,
and all the subsequent mechanical motions of the organism. But we can
present to our minds no picture of the process whereby consciousness
emerges, either as a necessary link or as an accidental by-product of
this series of actions. Yet it certainly does emer