sire, look upon Faraday's religious belief as
the exclusive source of qualities shared so conspicuously by one
uninfluenced by that belief. To a deeper virtue belonging to human
nature in its purer forms I am disposed to refer the excellence of
both.

Superstition may be defined as constructive religion which has grown
incongruous with intelligence. We may admit, with Fichte, 'that
superstition has unquestionably constrained its subjects to abandon
many pernicious practices and to adopt many useful ones;' the real
loss accompanying its decay at the present day has been thus clearly
stated by the same philosopher: 'In so far as these lamentations do
not proceed from the priests themselves--whose grief at the loss of
their dominion over the human mind we can well understand--but from
the politicians, the whole matter resolves itself into this, that
government has thereby become more difficult and expensive. The judge
was spared the exercise of his own sagacity and penetration when, by
threats of relentless damnation, he could compel the accused to make
confession. The evil spirit formerly performed without reward
services for which in later times judges and policemen have to be
paid.'

No man ever felt the need of a high and ennobling religion more
thoroughly than this powerful and fervid teacher, who, by the way, did
not escape the brand of 'atheist.' But Fichte asserted emphatically
the power and sufficiency of morality in its own sphere. 'Let us
consider,' he says, 'the highest which man can possess in the absence
of religion--I mean pure morality. The moral man obeys the law of
duty in his breast absolutely, because it is a law unto him; and he
does whatever reveals itself to him as his duty simply because it is
duty. Let not the impudent assertion be repeated that such an
obedience, without regard for consequences, and without desire for
consequences, is in itself impossible and opposed to human nature.'
So much for Fichte. Faraday was equally distinct. 'I have no
intention,' he says, 'of substituting anything for religion, but I
wish to take that part of human nature which is independent of it.
Morality, philosophy, commerce, the various institutions and habits of
society, are independent of religion and may exist without it.' These
were the words of his youth, but they expressed his latest
convictions. I would add, that the muse of Tennyson never reached a
higher strain than when it embodied the senti