an
of its intrinsic gravity, though its author has thought fit to give it
a witty and sarcastic tone. He analyses and criticises 'the
materialist doctrine, which, in our time, is proclaimed with so much
pomp, and resisted with so much passion. "Matter is all I want," says
the physicist; "give me its atoms alone, and I will explain the
universe."' It is thought, even by Mr. Martineau's intimate friends,
that in this pamphlet he is answering me. I must therefore ask the
reader to contrast the foregoing travesty with what I really do say
regarding atoms: 'I do not think that he [the materialist] is entitled
to say that his molecular groupings and motions _explain_ everything.
In reality, they explain nothing. The utmost he can affirm is the
association of two classes of phenomena, of whose real bond of union
he is in absolute ignorance.' [Footnote: Address on 'Scientific
Materialism.'] This is very different from saying, 'Give me its atoms
alone, and I will explain the universe.' Mr. Martineau continues his
dialogue with the physicist: '"Good," he says; "take as many atoms as
you please. See that they have all that is requisite to Body [a
metaphysical B], being homogeneous extended solids." "That is not
enough," his physicist replies; "it might do for Democritus and the
mathematicians, but I must have something more. The atoms must not
only be in motion, and of various shapes, but also of as many kinds as
there are chemical elements; for how could I ever get water if I had
only hydrogen elements to work with?" "So be it," Mr. Martineau
consents to answer, "only this is a considerable enlargement of your
specified datum [where, and by whom specified?]--in fact, a conversion
of it into several; yet, even at the cost of its monism [put into it
by Mr. Martineau], your scheme seems hardly to gain its end; for by
what manipulation of your resources will you, for example, educe
Consciousness?"'

This reads like pleasantry, but it deals with serious things. For the
last seven years the question here proposed by Mr. Martineau, and my
answer to it, have been accessible to all. The question, in my words,
is briefly this: 'A man can say, "I feel, I think, I love," but how
does consciousness infuse itself into the problem?' And here is my
answer: The passage from the physics of the brain to the corresponding
facts of consciousness is unthinkable. Granted that a definite
thought and a definite molecular action in the brain o