the social-contract fiction, does the real value of his
democratic teaching become clear, and the lasting influence of his work
become visible.

Mankind is compelled to adopt some form of government if it is to sleep at
nights without fear of being murdered in its bed, or if it wishes to have
its letters delivered by the postman in the morning. As the only purpose of
government is to secure mutual protection, mankind must obey this
government, or the purpose for which government exists will be defeated.
But the powers of government must be strictly limited if this necessary
consent of the governed is to continue, and if the government has ceased to
retain the confidence that gives consent, then its form may be changed to
some more appropriate shape.

Now all this theory of Locke's has proved to be true in the progress of
modern democracy. It was pointed out that the danger of his doctrine--that
a nation had the right to choose its form of government, and to change or
adapt its constitution--lay in the sanction it gave to revolution; but
Locke answered that the natural inertia of man was a safeguard against
frequent and violent political changes, and as far as England was concerned
Locke was right. The average Englishman grumbles, but only under great
provocation is he moved to violent political activity. As a nation, we have
acknowledged the right of the majority to make the political changes that
have brought in democracy, and we have accepted the changes loyally.
Occasionally, since Locke, the delay of the government in carrying out the
wishes of the majority has induced impatience, but, generally, the
principle has been acted upon that government is carried on with the
consent of the governed, and that the Parliamentary party which has
received the largest number of votes has the authority from the people to
choose its ministry, and to make laws that all must obey.

The power of the people is demonstrated by the free election of members of
Parliament, and, therefore, democracy requires that its authority be obeyed
by all who are represented in Parliament. There is no social contract
between the voter and the government; but there is a general feeling that
it is not so much participation in politics as the quiet enjoyment of the
privileges of citizenship that obliges submission to the laws. The
extension of the franchise was necessary whenever a body of people excluded
from the electorate was conscious of being unrep