s of
France, occupied by French troops, and upon them were forced
governments conformed to the existing French pattern. In short, the
aggrandizement of France, not merely in moral influence but in
physical control, was being pushed forward as decisively in peace as
in war, and by means which threatened the political equilibrium of
Europe. But, while all states were threatened, Great Britain remained
the one chief enemy against which ultimately the efforts of France
must be, and were, concentrated. "Either our government must destroy
the English monarchy," wrote Bonaparte at this time, "or must expect
itself to be destroyed by the corruption and intrigue of those active
islanders." The British ministry on its part also realized that the
sea-power of their country was the one force from which, because so
manifold in its activities, and so readily exerted in many quarters
by reason of its mobility, France had most reason to fear the arrest
of its revolutionary advance and the renewal of the Continental war.
It was, therefore, the one opponent against which the efforts of the
French must necessarily be directed. For the same reason it was the
one centre around whose action, wisely guided, the elements of
discontent, already stirring, might gather, upon the occurrence of a
favorable moment, and constitute a body of resistance capable of
stopping aggressions which threatened the general well-being.

When the British Government found that the overtures for peace which
it had made in the summer of 1797 could have no result, except on
terms too humiliating to be considered, it at once turned its
attention to the question of waging a distinctively offensive war, for
effect in which co-operation was needed. The North of Europe was
hopeless. Prussia persisted in the policy of isolation, adopted in
1795 by herself and a number of the northern German states. Russia was
quietly hostile to France, but the interference contemplated by the
Empress Catherine had been averted by her death in 1796, and her
successor, Paul, had shown no intention of undertaking it. There
remained, therefore, the Mediterranean. In Italy, France stood face to
face with Austria and Naples, and both these were dissatisfied with
the action taken by her in the Peninsula itself and in Switzerland,
besides sharing the apprehension of most other governments from the
disquiet attending her political course. An advance into the
Mediterranean was therefore resolved by