ent
summer roadstead. The French fleet was anchored there, under the
shelter of the island and rocks, in an order such that "the wind blew
nearly along the line." Its situation offered no local protection
against an enemy's approach, except that due to ignorance of the
ground.

It was therefore Brueys's business to meet this defect of protection
by adequate dispositions; and this he failed to do. Numerically his
force was the same as Nelson's; but, while the latter had only
seventy-fours, there were in the French fleet one ship of one hundred
and twenty guns, and three eighties. In a military sense, every line
divides naturally into three parts,--the centre, and the two ends, or
flanks; and it is essential that these should so far support one
another that an enemy cannot attack any two in superior force, while
the third is unable to assist. Shallow water, such as was found in
Aboukir Bay, if properly utilized, will prevent a flank being turned,
so that an enemy can get on both sides of the ships there, or
otherwise concentrate upon them, as by enfilading; and if, in
addition, the ships are anchored close to each other, it becomes
impossible for two of the attacking force to direct their fire upon
one of the defence, without being exposed to reprisals from those next
astern and ahead. These evident precautions received no illustration
in the arrangements of Admiral Brueys. The general direction of his
line was that of the wind, from northwest to southeast, with a very
slight bend, as shown in the diagram. The leading--northwestern--ship
was brought close to the shoal in thirty feet of water, but not so
close as to prevent the British passing round her, turning that flank;
and there were between the successive ships intervals of five hundred
feet, through any one of which an enemy could readily pass. Brueys had
very properly accumulated his most powerful vessels at the centre. The
flagship "Orient," of one hundred and twenty guns, was seventh in the
order; next ahead and astern of her were, respectively, the "Franklin"
and the "Tonnant," each of eighty. By a singular misconception,
however, he had thought that any attack would fall upon the rear--the
lee flank; and to this utter misapprehension of the exposed points it
was owing that he there placed his next heaviest ships. Nelson's
fore-determined onslaught upon the van accordingly fell on the weakest
of the French vessels.

Such was the French order of battle. The pr