aracter
of his career before and after; and a casual remark, written ten days
after the affair, shows his opinion confirmed by time. "Had our good
admiral followed the blow, we should probably have done more, but the
risk was thought too great."

The question attracts attention, both impersonally, as of military
interest, and also as bearing upon Nelson's correctness of judgment,
and professional characteristics, at this time. As regards the amount
of wind, it is sufficient to say that the French fleet, having borne
away to the westward in the afternoon, was next day out of sight.[28]
Most of the British might equally have been out of sight from the
position in which they remained. As for the risk--of course there was
risk; but the whole idea of a general chase rests upon the fact that,
for one reason or another, the extreme speed of the ships in each
fleet will vary, and that it is always probable that the fastest of
the pursuers can overtake the slowest of the pursued. The resulting
combats compel the latter either to abandon his ships, or to incur a
general action, which, from the fact of his flight, it is evident he
has reason to avoid. In this case many of the retreating French were
crippled,--some went off towed by frigates, and some without
bowsprits. Unquestionably, the pursuers who thus engage may be
overpowered before those following them come up; but the balance of
chances is generally in their favor, and in the particular instance
would have been markedly so, as was shown by the results of the two
days' fighting, which had proved the superior quality of the British
ships' companies.

The fact is, neither Hotham nor his opponent, Martin, was willing to
hazard a decisive naval action, but wished merely to obtain a
temporary advantage,--the moment's safety, no risks. "I have good
reason," wrote Hotham in his despatch, "to hope, from the enemy's
steering to the westward after having passed our fleet, that whatever
might have been their design, _their intentions are for the present
frustrated_." It is scarcely necessary to say that a man who looks no
further ahead than this, who fails to realize that the destruction of
the enemy's fleet is the one condition of permanent safety to his
cause, will not rise to the conception presented to him on his
quarter-deck by Nelson. The latter, whether by the sheer intuition of
genius, which is most probable, or by the result of well-ordered
reasoning, which is less likely,