e reply, however, to this very obvious criticism
is, that the British could not supply the crews for them without
crippling the efficiency of the cruising fleet; and it was justly felt
then, as it was some years later at the time of the Boulogne flotilla,
that the prime duty of Great Britain was to secure the sea against the
heavy fleets of the enemy. If, indeed, the Italian States, whose
immediate interests were at stake, had supplied seamen, as they might
have done, these could quickly have been formed to the comparatively
easy standard of discipline and training needed for such guerilla
warfare, and, supported by the cruising fleet, might have rendered
invaluable service, so long as the system of coast defence was
defective. How far the rulers of those States, trained heretofore to
the narrowest considerations of personal policy, could have been
induced to extend this assistance, is doubtful. They did nothing, or
little.

Nelson measured the odds against him accurately, and saw that the
situation was well-nigh hopeless. Nevertheless, there was a chance
that by vigorous and sustained action the enemy might be not only
impeded, but intimidated. He sought earnestly to obtain the
co-operation of the Sardinians and Neapolitans in manning a flotilla,
with which to grapple the convoys as they passed in shore. By this
means, and the close scouring of the coast by the vessels of his
squadron, something might be effected. He contemplated also using the
crews of the British vessels themselves in gunboats and light-armed
feluccas; but he said frankly that, important as was the duty of
intercepting communications, the efficiency of the fleet was more
important still, and that to divert their crews over-much to such
objects would hazard the vessels themselves, and neutralize their
proper work. The resort, therefore, could only be occasional. The
general political complexion of affairs in the Mediterranean depended
greatly upon the presence and readiness of the British fleet, and its
efficiency therefore could not be risked, to any serious extent,
except for the object of destroying the enemy's naval forces, to which
it was then the counterpoise.

Acting, however, on his determination to co-operate effectively, at
whatever risk to his own squadron,--to the detachment, that is, which
the commander-in-chief thought could safely be spared from his main
force for the secondary object,--Nelson applied all his intelligence
and all his