riving
benefit from their useful experiences, and avoiding the defects that
have grown up under their system. All institutions are more or less on
trial in a country like Canada, which is working out great problems of
political science under decided advantages, since the ground is
relatively new, and the people have before them all the experiences of
the world, especially of England and the United States, in whose
systems Canadians have naturally the deepest interest. The history of
responsible government affords another illustration of a truth which
stands out clear in the history of nations, that those constitutions
which are of a flexible character, the natural growth of the
experiences of centuries, and which have been created by the
necessities and conditions of the times, possess the elements of real
stability, and best ensure the prosperity of a people. The great
source of the strength of the institutions of the United States lies
in the fact that they have worked out their government in accordance
with certain principles, which are essentially English in their
origin, and have been naturally developed since their foundation as
colonial settlements, and whatever weaknesses their system shows have
chiefly arisen from new methods, and from the rigidity of their
constitutional rules of law, which separate too sharply the executive
and the legislative branches of government. Like their neighbours the
Canadian people have based their system on English principles, but
they have at the same time been able to keep pace with the progress of
the unwritten constitution of England, to adapt it to their own
political conditions, and to bring the executive and legislative
authorities to assist and harmonize with one another.

Each country has its "cabinet council," but the one is essentially
different from the other in its character and functions. This term,
the historical student will remember, was first used in the days of
the Stuarts as one of derision and obloquy. It was frequently called
"junto" or "cabal," and during the days of conflict between the
commons and the king it was regarded with great disfavour by the
parliament of England. Its unpopularity arose from the fact that it
did not consist of men in whom parliament had confidence, and its
proceedings were conducted with so much secrecy that it was impossible
to decide upon whom to fix responsibility for any obnoxious measure.
When the constitution of England was b