the forty thousand men under McDowell, his position would have been
a safe one. General McDowell did not arrive; and this unprotected
right flank--left unprotected from the fact that McDowell's presence
was counted on--became the point of the Confederate attack.

The amount of blame, if any, justly attributable to General McClellan,
first for his inactivity, and then for his defeat by Lee, cannot be
referred to here, save in a few brief sentences. A sort of feud
seems to have arisen between himself and General Halleck, the
commander-in-chief, stationed at Washington; and General Halleck then
and afterward appears to have regarded McClellan as a soldier without
decision or broad generalship. And yet McClellan does not seem to
have merited the censure he received. He called persistently for
reinforcements, remaining inactive meanwhile, because he estimated
the Confederate army before him at two hundred thousand men, and
was unwilling to assail this force, under command of soldiers
like Johnston and Lee, until his own force seemed adequate to the
undertaking. Another consideration was, the Confederate position in
front of the powerful earthworks of the city. These works would double
the Confederate strength in case of battle in front of them; and,
believing himself already outnumbered, the Federal commander was
naturally loath to deliver battle until reenforced. The faulty
disposition of his army, divided by a stream crossed by few bridges,
has been accounted for in like manner--he so disposed the troops,
expecting reenforcements. But Jackson's energy delayed these.
Washington was in danger, it was supposed, and General McDowell did
not come. It thus happened that General McClellan awaited attack
instead of making it, and that his army was so posted as to expose him
to the greatest peril.

A last point is to be noted in vindication of this able soldier.
Finding, at the very last moment, that he could expect no further
assistance from the President or General Halleck, he resolved promptly
to withdraw his exposed right wing and change his base of operations
to James River, where at least his communications would be safe. This,
it seems, had been determined upon just before the Confederate attack;
or, if he had not then decided, General McClellan soon determined upon
that plan.

To pass now to the Confederate side, where all was ready for the
great movement. General Lee's army lay in front of Richmond, exactly
correspondi