ation
of affairs, both from the political and military point of view, in a
spirit of the broadest statesmanship, and with the acumen of a great
soldier. That it had no effect, is the clearest indication upon which
the war was thenceforward to be conducted.
The removal of General McClellan, as holding views opposed to the
party in power, is said to have resulted from this communication.
It certainly placed him in open antagonism to General Halleck, the
Federal Secretary of War, and, as this antagonism had a direct effect
upon even connected with the subject of our memoir, we shall briefly
relate now it was now displayed.
Defeated on the Chickahominy, and seeing little to encourage an
advance, on the left bank of the James, upon Richmond, General
McClellan proposed to cross that river and operate against the capital
and its communications, near Petersburg. The proof of McClellan's
desire to undertake this movement, which afterward proved so
successful under General Grant, is found in a memorandum, by General
Halleck himself, of what took place on a visit paid by him to
McClellan, at Harrison's Landing, on July 25, 1862.
"I stated to him," says General Halleck, "that the object of my visit
was to ascertain from him his views and wishes in regard to future
operations. He said that he proposed to cross the James River at that
point, attack Petersburg, and cut off the enemy's communications by
that route South, making no further demonstration for the present
against Richmond. I stated to him very frankly my views in regard to
the manner and impracticability of the plan;" and nothing further, it
seems, was said of this highly "impracticable" plan of operations. It
became practicable afterward under General Grant; McClellan was not
permitted to essay it in July, 1862, from the fact that it had been
resolved to relieve him from command, or from General Halleck's
inability to perceive its good sense.
General Lee's views upon this subject coincided completely with those
of General McClellan. He expressed at this time, to those in his
confidence, the opinion that Richmond could be assailed to greater
advantage from the South, as a movement of the enemy in that direction
would menace her communications with the Gulf States; and events
subsequently proved the soundness of this view. Attacks from all
other quarters failed, including a repetition by General Grant of
McClellan's attempt from the side of the Chickahominy. When G
|