forwarding it:

"General Magruder is under a misapprehension as to the separation of
troops operating on the north side of the Chickahominy from those
under himself and General Huger on the south side. He refers to this
subject on pages 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, of his report.

"The troops on the two sides of the river were only separated until we
succeeded in occupying the position near what is known as New Bridge,
which occurred before twelve o'clock M. on Friday, June 27th, and
before the attack on the enemy at Gaines's Mill.

"From the time we reached the position referred to, I regarded
communication between the two wings of our army as reestablished.

"The bridge referred to, and another about three-quarters of a mile
above, were ordered to be repaired before noon on Friday, and the New
Bridge was sufficiently rebuilt to be passed by artillery on Friday
night, and the one above it was used for the passage of wagons,
ambulances, and troops, early on Saturday morning.

"Besides this, all other bridges above New Bridge, and all the fords
above that point, were open to us."

To this General Magruder subsequently responded as follows:

"New Bridge was finished on Friday evening, the 27th, instead of
Saturday, 28th of June.

"I wrote from memory in reference to the time of its being finished.

"It was reported to me that the bridge three-quarters of a mile above
was attempted to be crossed by troops (I think Ransom's brigade), on
Saturday morning, from the south to the north side, but that, finding
the bridge or the approach to it difficult, they came down and crossed
at New Bridge on the same morning.

"My statement in regard to these bridges was not intended as a
criticism on General Lee's plan, but to show the position of the
troops, with a view to the proper understanding of my report, and to
prove that the enemy might have reasonably entertained a design, after
concentrating his troops, to march on Richmond."

We shall not detain the reader by entering upon a full discussion of
the interesting question here raised. General Lee, as his observations
on General Magruder's report show, did not regard Richmond as exposed
to serious danger, and was confident of his ability to recross the
Chickahominy and go to its succor in the event of an attack on the
city by General McClellan. Had this prompt recrossing of the stream
here, even, been impracticable, it may still be a question whether
General Lee did not, in h