o the camp of the Kentuckians, and delivered there about
nightfall of the seventh. Four hundred more of the Kentuckians were thus
armed and moved up to the rear of the breastwork, ready for the battle
next morning. Adair believed that he was acting in the line of his duty,
and that Jackson would approve of his device for arming more of his idle
men in camp. Busy as he was that day in New Orleans, and in equipping
and marshaling the men of his command for battle, he was not made aware
of the urgent need of reinforcements on the opposite bank of the river,
nor did he know of the purpose of the commander-in-chief to arm these
from the city armory. While Adair's device very much strengthened
Jackson's line on the left bank, it unfortunately defeated Jackson's
plan of sending four hundred more men to reinforce General Morgan on the
right bank, and may in this way have largely contributed to the latter's
defeat.

When Jackson, late on the seventh, ordered a detail of five hundred of
the Kentucky militia to be marched at once to New Orleans, there to be
armed, to cross the river and report by daylight to General Morgan, he
expected to use the arms from the city armory. There was no other
supply.

We may readily imagine the feeling of disappointed chagrin and passion
that stirred to its depths the strong nature of Jackson, when the
intelligence quickly came to him across the river of the disaster to
Morgan's command, and of its retreat toward New Orleans, followed by the
enemy. It was in this tumult of passion and excitement that the report
of Morgan, followed by that of Patterson, was brought to him, imputing
the cause of defeat and disaster to the cowardly retreat of the Kentucky
detachment. Under the promptings of these incidents of the day,
Jackson's report to the Secretary of War was made, in which the words of
censure were so unjustly employed. Jackson must have informed Morgan on
the evening of the seventh that he would reinforce him with five hundred
armed soldiers. When Colonel Davis reported to Morgan, one hour before
daylight, the arrival of the Kentucky contingent, the latter was
expecting five hundred men to reinforce him. Had this been done, the
Kentucky troops and Major Arnaud's one hundred and fifty Louisianians
would have made the forces sent to the front to check the advance of the
British under Colonel Thornton over six hundred men. Such a force, well
officered, would probably have held the enemy in check, f