pen-picture of the chaotic and wretched condition of the
English army after the crushing defeat of the eighth, and until its
final return to the fleet, is given by Gleig in his "Narrative of the
Campaigns." It will be read with all the more interest because it is the
frank admission of a brave though prejudiced officer, giving an enemy's
view of the great disaster that befell the British arms, in which he
fully shared:

General Lambert prudently determined not to risk the safety of his
army by another attempt upon works evidently so much beyond our
strength. He considered that his chances of success were in every
respect lessened by the late repulse. An extraordinary degree of
confidence was given to the enemy, while our forces were greatly
diminished in numbers. If again defeated, nothing could save our army
from destruction; it could only now retreat in force. A retreat,
therefore, was resolved upon while the measure appeared practicable,
and toward that end all our future operations were directed.

One great obstacle existed; by what road were the troops to travel to
regain the fleet? On landing, we had taken advantage of the bayou,
and thus come within two miles of the cultivated country, in our
barges. To return by the same route was impossible. In spite of our
losses there were not enough boats to transport above one half of the
army at one time. If we separated, the chances were that both
divisions would be destroyed; for those embarked might be
intercepted, and those left behind might be attacked by the whole
American army. To obviate the difficulty, it required that we should
build a passable road through the swamp, to Lake Borgne, some twenty
miles away. The task was burthened with innumerable difficulties.
There was no firm foundation on which to work, and no trees to assist
in forming hurdles. All we could do was to bind together large
quantities of swamp weeds and lay them across the quagmire. It was
but the semblance of a road, without firmness and solidity.

To complete this road, bad as it was, occupied nine days, during
which our army lay in camp, making no attempt to molest the enemy.
The Americans, however, were not so inactive. A battery of six guns,
mounted on the opposite bank, kept up a continued fire upon our men.
The same mode of proceeding was adopted in front, and thus, night and
day we were harassed by