e successfully repulse an attack at Raquet's line than
at the line selected by Latour farther away. This change in the
situation and plan of defense is characterized by Latour and other
authorities as an unmilitary proceeding, as it abandoned the idea of a
fortified line behind which a successful defense could have been made
probable, if not certain, for an almost open field subject to the
flanking movement of veteran troops against raw militia, with no
auxiliary support except a park of artillery with guns turned another
way, and of most doubtful use in case of need. General Morgan must not
share alone the criticism which has been so freely made of his
disposition of forces and changes of strategic plans which resulted in
sensational disaster to his command. Commodore Patterson, experienced in
military affairs as well as naval, advised with him, and must have
approved. This change of line, made some days before the eighth, must
have been known, and on the representations of Morgan and Patterson,
approved by General Jackson. It is not conceivable that so important a
change of plans would have been made by a subordinate officer, affecting
seriously the safety of New Orleans, without the consent of the
commander-in-chief. The latter seemed always to have held in very high
personal esteem these two officers, and to have had confidence in their
abilities as commanders.

As mentioned above, the dispositions made for a line of defense by Major
Latour were changed by General Morgan, and the negroes set to work on
Raquet's line. A breastwork fortification was thrown up by the seventh
of January, extending but two hundred yards from the river bank out on
the site of the old canal. From this terminus across the plantation land
to the wooded swamp was an open plain, with scarce an obstruction to the
deploy of troops or the sweep of artillery. The old canal had long been
in disuse, and the ditch was filled nearly full with the washings and
deposits of years. Behind this two hundred yards of entrenchment General
Morgan massed all the Louisiana troops of his command and planted his
artillery, three pieces in all. From the end of the breastwork on the
right, one mile or eighteen hundred yards to the swamp, there were no
defensive works from behind which to repulse the assault of an enemy,
nor any means of resistance in sight to an attack, other than the guns
in battery of Commodore Patterson, of more than doubtful use, and the
yet ver