the British by means of an encircling
movement before the arrival of their reinforcements. Railways
allow of the assembly of these forces (inclusive of heavy
artillery, material and technical stores) in the neighbourhood
of Beersheba by the end of October. The disposable parts
of the IVth Army (two to three divisions) would be added
to it.

In a discussion between Enver, Jemal, and myself, Enver
decided first of all to strengthen the IVth Army by the
inclusion of one division from the Army Group. This
division would suffice to ward off attack. The Irak undertaking
could be carried through at the same time. Judging
from all former experiences I am firmly convinced as soon
as it comes to a question of the expected attack on the
Sinai Front, or even if the IVth Army only feels itself seriously
threatened, further troops, munitions, and material will be
withdrawn from the Army Group, and Turkey's forces will
be shattered.

Then nothing decisive can be undertaken in either theatre
of war. The sacrifice of men, money, and material which
Germany is offering at the present moment will be in vain.

The treatment of the question is rendered all the more
difficult because I cannot rid myself of the impression that
the decision of the Turkish Higher Command is based far
less on military exigencies than on personal motives. It
is dictated with one eye on the mighty Jemal, who deprecates
a definite decision, but yet on the other hand opposes the
slightest diminution of the area of his command.

Consequently as the position now stands, I consider the
Irak undertaking practicable only if it is given the necessary
freedom for retirement through the removal of the danger
on the Syrian Front. The removal of this danger I regard
as only possible through attack. V. FALKENHAYN.

III

Here is another German estimate of the position created by our
War Cabinet's decision to take the offensive in Palestine, and in
considering the view of the German Staff and the prospect of success
any Turkish attack would have, it must be borne in mind that under
the most favourable circumstances the enemy could not have been in
position for taking an offensive before the end of October. Von
Falkenhayn wished to attack the British 'before the arrival of their
reinforcements.' Not only had our reinforcements arrived before the
end of October, but they were all in position and the ba