h with 2700 rifles. The enemy held a line covering
Bethlehem across the Hebron road to Balua, then to the hill Kibryan
south-west of Beit Jala, whence the line proceeded due north to Ain
Karim and Deir Yesin, both of which were strongly entrenched, on to
the hill overlooking the Jerusalem road above Lifta. From this
point the line crossed the road to the high ground west of Beit
Iksa--entrenchments were cut deep into the face of this hill to cover
the road from Kulonieh--thence northward again to the east of Nebi
Samwil, west of El Jib, Dreihemeh (one mile north-east of Beit Dukku)
to Foka, Kh. Aberjan, and beyond Suffa.

During the attack the Australian Mounted Division was to protect the
left flank of the 10th Division, which with one brigade of the 74th
Division was to hold the whole of the line in the hills from Tahta
through Foka, Dukku, Beit Izza to Nebi Samwil, leaving the attack to
be conducted by two brigade groups of the 74th Division, the whole of
the 60th Division, and two brigade groups of the 53rd Division, with
the 10th regiment of Australian Light Horse watching the right flank
of the 60th Division until the left of the 53rd could join up with
it. One brigade of the 53rd Division was to advance from the
Bethlehem-Beit Jala area with its left on the line drawn from Sherafat
through Malhah to protect the 60th Division's flank, the other brigade
marching direct on Jerusalem, and to move by roads south of the
town to a position covering Jerusalem from the east and north-east,
but--and these were instructions specially impressed on this
brigade--'the City of Jerusalem will not be entered, and all movements
by troops and vehicles will be restricted to roads passing outside the
City.' The objective of the 60th and 74th Divisions was a general line
from Ras et Tawil, a hill east of the Nablus road about four miles
north of Jerusalem, to Nebi Samwil, one brigade of the 74th Division
holding Nebi Samwil and Beit Izza defences and to form the pivot of
the attack. The dividing line between the 60th and 74th Divisions was
the Enab-Jerusalem road as far as Lifta and from that place to the
wadi Beit Hannina. The form of the attack was uncertain until it was
known how the enemy would meet the advance of the 53rd Division,
which, on the 3rd December, was in a position north of Hebron within
two ten-mile marches of the point at which it would co-operate on
the right of the 60th. If the enemy increased his strength south o