er said to be of
something else or related to something else, are explained by reference
to that other thing. For instance, the word 'superior' is explained by
reference to something else, for it is superiority over something else
that is meant. Similarly, the expression 'double' has this external
reference, for it is the double of something else that is meant. So it
is with everything else of this kind. There are, moreover, other
relatives, e.g. habit, disposition, perception, knowledge, and
attitude. The significance of all these is explained by a reference to
something else and in no other way. Thus, a habit is a habit of
something, knowledge is knowledge of something, attitude is the
attitude of something. So it is with all other relatives that have been
mentioned. Those terms, then, are called relative, the nature of which
is explained by reference to something else, the preposition 'of' or
some other preposition being used to indicate the relation. Thus, one
mountain is called great in comparison with son with another; for the
mountain claims this attribute by comparison with something. Again,
that which is called similar must be similar to something else, and all
other such attributes have this external reference. It is to be noted
that lying and standing and sitting are particular attitudes, but
attitude is itself a relative term. To lie, to stand, to be seated, are
not themselves attitudes, but take their name from the aforesaid
attitudes.

It is possible for relatives to have contraries. Thus virtue has a
contrary, vice, these both being relatives; knowledge, too, has a
contrary, ignorance. But this is not the mark of all relatives;
'double' and 'triple' have no contrary, nor indeed has any such term.

It also appears that relatives can admit of variation of degree. For
'like' and 'unlike', 'equal' and 'unequal', have the modifications
'more' and 'less' applied to them, and each of these is relative in
character: for the terms 'like' and 'unequal' bear 'unequal' bear a
reference to something external. Yet, again, it is not every relative
term that admits of variation of degree. No term such as 'double'
admits of this modification. All relatives have correlatives: by the
term 'slave' we mean the slave of a master, by the term 'master', the
master of a slave; by 'double', the double of its hall; by 'half', the
half of its double; by 'greater', greater than that which is less; by
'less,' less than that which is