nd the things that take their name from
them as derivatives, or are in some other way dependent on them, are
said to be qualified in some specific way. In most, indeed in almost
all cases, the name of that which is qualified is derived from that of
the quality. Thus the terms 'whiteness', 'grammar', 'justice', give us
the adjectives 'white', 'grammatical', 'just', and so on.
There are some cases, however, in which, as the quality under
consideration has no name, it is impossible that those possessed of it
should have a name that is derivative. For instance, the name given to
the runner or boxer, who is so called in virtue of an inborn capacity,
is not derived from that of any quality; for lob those capacities have
no name assigned to them. In this, the inborn capacity is distinct from
the science, with reference to which men are called, e.g. boxers or
wrestlers. Such a science is classed as a disposition; it has a name,
and is called 'boxing' or 'wrestling' as the case may be, and the name
given to those disposed in this way is derived from that of the
science. Sometimes, even though a name exists for the quality, that
which takes its character from the quality has a name that is not a
derivative. For instance, the upright man takes his character from the
possession of the quality of integrity, but the name given him is not
derived from the word 'integrity'. Yet this does not occur often.
We may therefore state that those things are said to be possessed of
some specific quality which have a name derived from that of the
aforesaid quality, or which are in some other way dependent on it.
One quality may be the contrary of another; thus justice is the
contrary of injustice, whiteness of blackness, and so on. The things,
also, which are said to be such and such in virtue of these qualities,
may be contrary the one to the other; for that which is unjust is
contrary to that which is just, that which is white to that which is
black. This, however, is not always the case. Red, yellow, and such
colours, though qualities, have no contraries.
If one of two contraries is a quality, the other will also be a
quality. This will be evident from particular instances, if we apply
the names used to denote the other categories; for instance, granted
that justice is the contrary of injustice and justice is a quality,
injustice will also be a quality: neither quantity, nor relation, nor
place, nor indeed any other category but that of
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