n citizens do not teach their sons political virtue.
Will Protagoras answer these objections?

Protagoras explains his views in the form of an apologue, in which,
after Prometheus had given men the arts, Zeus is represented as sending
Hermes to them, bearing with him Justice and Reverence. These are not,
like the arts, to be imparted to a few only, but all men are to
be partakers of them. Therefore the Athenian people are right in
distinguishing between the skilled and unskilled in the arts, and not
between skilled and unskilled politicians. (1) For all men have the
political virtues to a certain degree, and are obliged to say that
they have them, whether they have them or not. A man would be thought
a madman who professed an art which he did not know; but he would be
equally thought a madman if he did not profess a virtue which he had
not. (2) And that the political virtues can be taught and acquired, in
the opinion of the Athenians, is proved by the fact that they punish
evil-doers, with a view to prevention, of course--mere retribution is
for beasts, and not for men. (3) Again, would parents who teach her sons
lesser matters leave them ignorant of the common duty of citizens? To
the doubt of Socrates the best answer is the fact, that the education
of youth in virtue begins almost as soon as they can speak, and is
continued by the state when they pass out of the parental control. (4)
Nor need we wonder that wise and good fathers sometimes have foolish and
worthless sons. Virtue, as we were saying, is not the private possession
of any man, but is shared by all, only however to the extent of which
each individual is by nature capable. And, as a matter of fact, even the
worst of civilized mankind will appear virtuous and just, if we compare
them with savages. (5) The error of Socrates lies in supposing that
there are no teachers of virtue, whereas all men are teachers in a
degree. Some, like Protagoras, are better than others, and with this
result we ought to be satisfied.

Socrates is highly delighted with the explanation of Protagoras. But he
has still a doubt lingering in his mind. Protagoras has spoken of the
virtues: are they many, or one? are they parts of a whole, or different
names of the same thing? Protagoras replies that they are parts, like
the parts of a face, which have their several functions, and no one part
is like any other part. This admission, which has been somewhat hastily
made, is now taken up and