by Government.

The composite vote and the cumulative vote have been almost universally
rejected as schemes for baffling the majority. But the principle of
dividing the representatives equally between population and property has
never had fair play. It was introduced by Thouret into the constitution
of 1791. The Revolution made it inoperative; and it was so manipulated
from 1817 to 1848 by the fatal dexterity of Guizot as to make opinion
ripe for universal suffrage.

Constitutions which forbid the payment of deputies and the system of
imperative instructions, which deny the power of dissolution, and make
the Legislature last for a fixed term, or renew it by partial
re-elections, and which require an interval between the several debates
on the same measure, evidently strengthen the independence of the
representative assembly. The Swiss veto has the same effect, as it
suspends legislation only when opposed by a majority of the whole
electoral body, not by a majority of those who actually vote upon it.

Indirect elections are scarcely anywhere in use out of Germany, but they
have been a favourite corrective of democracy with many thoughtful
politicians. Where the extent of the electoral district obliges
constituents to vote for candidates who are unknown to them, the
election is not free. It is managed by wire-pullers, and by party
machinery, beyond the control of the electors. Indirect election puts
the choice of the managers into their hands. The objection is that the
intermediate electors are generally too few to span the interval between
voters and candidates, and that they choose representatives not of
better quality, but of different politics. If the intermediate body
consisted of one in ten of the whole constituency, the contact would be
preserved, the people would be really represented, and the ticket system
would be broken down.

The one pervading evil of democracy is the tyranny of the majority, or
rather of that party, not always the majority, that succeeds, by force
or fraud, in carrying elections. To break off that point is to avert the
danger. The common system of representation perpetuates the danger.
Unequal electorates afford no security to majorities. Equal electorates
give none to minorities. Thirty-five years ago it was pointed out that
the remedy is proportional representation. It is profoundly democratic,
for it increases the influence of thousands who would otherwise have no
voice in the governm