ease, we have far surpassed them in studying the remedy. Besides the
French Constitution of the year III., and that of the American
Confederates,--the most remarkable attempts that have been made since
the archonship of Euclides to meet democratic evils with the antidotes
which democracy itself supplies,--our age has been prolific in this
branch of experimental politics.

Many expedients have been tried, that have been evaded or defeated. A
divided executive, which was an important phase in the transformation of
ancient monarchies into republics, and which, through the advocacy of
Condorcet, took root in France, has proved to be weakness itself.

The constitution of 1795, the work of a learned priest, confined the
franchise to those who should know how to read and write; and in 1849
this provision was rejected by men who intended that the ignorant voter
should help them to overturn the Republic. In our time no democracy
could long subsist without educating the masses; and the scheme of
Daunou is simply an indirect encouragement to elementary instruction.

In 1799 Sieyes suggested to Bonaparte the idea of a great Council, whose
function it should be to keep the acts of the Legislature in harmony
with the constitution--a function which the _Nomophylakes_ discharged at
Athens, and the Supreme Court in the United States, and which produced
the Senat Conservateur, one of the favourite implements of Imperialism.
Sieyes meant that his Council should also serve the purpose of a gilded
ostracism, having power to absorb any obnoxious politician, and to
silence him with a thousand a year.

Napoleon the Third's plan of depriving unmarried men of their votes
would have disfranchised the two greatest Conservative classes in
France, the priest and the soldier.

In the American constitution it was intended that the chief of the
executive should be chosen by a body of carefully selected electors. But
since, in 1825, the popular candidate succumbed to one who had only a
minority of votes, it has become the practice to elect the President by
the pledged delegates of universal suffrage.

The exclusion of ministers from Congress has been one of the severest
strains on the American system; and the law which required a majority of
three to one enabled Louis Napoleon to make himself Emperor. Large
constituencies make independent deputies; but experience proves that
small assemblies, the consequence of large constituencies, can be
managed