e fifth vessel, the _Stephano_, a British
passenger liner plying regularly between New York, Halifax, N. S., and
St. John's, Newfoundland. Among the _Stephano's_ passengers were a
number of Americans, who, like their companions in misfortune, had to
seek the doubtful safety of small boats miles offshore.

The situation was saved by the presence of American destroyers in the
vicinity. Their commanders and crews were actual witnesses of the
sinking, and afterward interposed as life savers of the shipwrecked
victims. The _Balch_ rescued the passengers and crew of the
_Stephano_, numbering 140, and other destroyers took on board the
crews of the four freighters. The American navy in saving Germany's
victims had saved Germany from facing the consequences of her behavior
in jeopardizing the lives of Americans on board the _Stephano_. German
diplomacy was even capable of pointing to the fact that the prompt
relief afforded the _Stephano's_ passengers by American destroyers was
proof that the submarine commander had safeguarded their lives by
relying upon the American navy as a rescuer. The irony of such a
contention lay in the implication that if American destroyers had not
been on the scene the vessels might have been spared.

It was a short-lived panic. The _U-53_ came and went in a flash; but
amid the scare created by its presence President Wilson found it
necessary to assure the country that "the German Government will be
held to the complete fulfillment of its promise to the Government of
the United States. I have no right now," he added, "to question its
willingness to fulfill them."

The Administration's deliberations on the subject produced the
decision that the _U-53_ had not ignored the German pledges. It came,
saw, and conquered according to formula. It had first warned the
vessels, gave enough time for the people on board to be "safely"
transferred to boats, and there were American naval eyewitnesses to
testify as to the regularity of its proceedings. The incident passed
as one on which no action could be taken by the United States. But
Germany saw that it could not well be repeated. American sensibilities
had to be respected as much as international proprieties. The reproof
conveyed to the British Ambassador by Secretary Lansing that "the
constant and menacing presence of cruisers on the high seas near the
ports of a neutral country may be regarded according to the canons of
international courtesy as a just gro