leaves in the
midst of their "difficulty." I beg to assure him (with thanks for his
friendly remarks) that entrance-fees and subscriptions are things
unknown in that most economical of clubs, "The Knot-Untiers."

The authors of the 26 "accidental" solutions differ only in the number
of steps they have taken between the _data_ and the answers. In order
to do them full justice I have arranged the 2nd class in sections,
according to the number of steps. The two Kings are fearfully
deliberate! I suppose walking quick, or taking short cuts, is
inconsistent with kingly dignity: but really, in reading THESEUS'
solution, one almost fancied he was "marking time," and making no
advance at all! The other King will, I hope, pardon me for having
altered "Coal" into "Cole." King Coilus, or Coil, seems to have reigned
soon after Arthur's time. Henry of Huntingdon identifies him with the
King Coel who first built walls round Colchester, which was named after
him. In the Chronicle of Robert of Gloucester we read:--

"Aftur Kyng Aruirag, of wam we habbeth y told,
Marius ys sone was kyng, quoynte mon & bold.
And ys sone was aftur hym, _Coil_ was ys name,
Bothe it were quoynte men, & of noble fame."

BALBUS lays it down as a general principle that "in order to ascertain
the cost of any one luncheon, it must come to the same amount upon two
different assumptions." (_Query._ Should not "it" be "we"? Otherwise the
_luncheon_ is represented as wishing to ascertain its own cost!) He then
makes two assumptions--one, that sandwiches cost nothing; the other,
that biscuits cost nothing, (either arrangement would lead to the shop
being inconveniently crowded!)--and brings out the unknown luncheons as
8_d._ and 19_d._, on each assumption. He then concludes that this
agreement of results "shows that the answers are correct." Now I propose
to disprove his general law by simply giving _one_ instance of its
failing. One instance is quite enough. In logical language, in order to
disprove a "universal affirmative," it is enough to prove its
contradictory, which is a "particular negative." (I must pause for a
digression on Logic, and especially on Ladies' Logic. The universal
affirmative "everybody says he's a duck" is crushed instantly by proving
the particular negative "Peter says he's a goose," which is equivalent
to "Peter does _not_ say he's a duck." And the universal negative
"nobody calls on her" is well met by the particular affirmati