t on the way, and on seeing Jefferson
Davis's instructions, promptly notified the commissioners that they
could not proceed further without complying strictly with President
Lincoln's terms. Thus, at half-past nine on the night of February 1,
their mission was practically at an end, though next day they again
recanted and accepted the President's conditions in writing. Mr.
Lincoln, on reading Major Eckert's report on the morning of February 2,
was about to recall Secretary Seward by telegraph, when he was shown a
confidential despatch from General Grant to the Secretary of War,
stating his belief that the intention of the commissioners was good, and
their desire for peace sincere, and regretting that Mr. Lincoln could
not have an interview with them. This communication served to change his
purpose. Resolving not to neglect the indications of sincerity here
described, he telegraphed at once, "Say to the gentlemen I will meet
them personally at Fortress Monroe as soon as I can get there," and
joined Secretary Seward that same night.

On the morning of February 3, 1865, the rebel commissioners were
conducted on board the _River Queen_, lying at anchor near Fort Monroe,
where President Lincoln and Secretary Seward awaited them. It was agreed
beforehand that no writing or memorandum should be made at the time, so
the record of the interview remains only in the separate accounts which
the rebel commissioners wrote out afterward from memory, neither Mr.
Seward nor President Lincoln ever having made any report in detail. In a
careful analysis of these reports, the first striking feature is the
difference of intention between the parties. It is apparent that Mr.
Lincoln went honestly and frankly to offer them the best terms he could
to, secure peace and reunion, but to abate no jot of official duty or
personal dignity; while the main thought of the commissioners was to
evade the express condition on which they had been admitted to
conference, to seek to postpone the vital issue, and to propose an
armistice by debating a mere juggling expedient against which they had
in a private agreement with one another already committed themselves.

At the first hint of Blair's Mexican project, however, Mr. Lincoln
firmly disclaimed any responsibility for the suggestion, or any
intention of adopting it, and during the four hours' talk led the
conversation continually back to the original object of the conference.
But though he patiently answ