ndles the animosity of one part against another;
foments, occasionally, riot and insurrection. It opens the door to
foreign influence and corruption, which find a facilitated access to the
government itself through the channels of party passions. Thus the
policy and the will of one country are subjected to the policy and will
of another.

There is an opinion that parties, in free countries, are useful checks
upon the administration of the government, and serve to keep alive the
spirit of liberty. This, within certain limits, is probably true; and in
governments of a monarchial cast, patriotism may look with indulgence,
if not with favor, upon the spirit of party. But in those of the popular
character, in governments purely elective, it is a spirit not to be
encouraged. From their natural tendency, it is certain there will always
be enough of that spirit for every salutatory purpose. And there being
constant danger of excess, the effort ought to be by force of public
opinion to mitigate and assuage it. A fire not to be quenched, it
demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a flame, lest,
instead of warming, it should consume.

It is important, likewise, that the habits of thinking, in a free
country, should inspire caution in those intrusted with its
administration, to confine themselves within their respective
constitutional spheres, avoiding, in the exercise of the powers of one
department, to encroach upon another. The spirit of encroachment tends
to consolidate the powers of all the departments into one, and thus to
create, whatever the form of government, a real despotism. A just
estimate of that love of power and proneness to abuse it which
predominate in the human heart is sufficient to satisfy us of the truth
of this position. The necessity of reciprocal checks in the exercise of
political power, by dividing and distributing it into different
depositories, and constituting each the guardian of the public weal,
against invasion by the others, has been evinced by experiments, ancient
and modern--some of them in our own country and under our own eyes. To
preserve them must be as necessary as to institute them. If, in the
opinion of the people, the distribution or modification of the
constitutional powers be, in any particular, wrong, let it be corrected
by an amendment in the way which the constitution designates. But let
there be no change by usurpation; for though this, in one instance, may
be the