nnection between the scene
and the individual. Many persons have testified to these occurrences,
many of them being matter-of-fact, unimaginative people, who had never
even heard of the doctrine of Reincarnation. Charles Dickens, in one of
his books of foreign travel, tells of a bridge in Italy which produced a
peculiar effect upon him. He says: "If I had been murdered there in some
former life, I could not have seemed to remember the place more
thoroughly, or with more emphatic chilling of the blood; and the real
remembrance of it acquired in that minute is so strengthened by the
imaginary recollection that I hardly think I could forget it." Another
recorded instance is that of a person entering a foreign library for the
first time. Passing to the department of ancient books, he said that he
had a dim idea that a certain rare book was to be found on such a shelf,
in such a corner, describing at the same time certain peculiarities of
the volume. A search failed to discover the volume in the stated place,
but investigation showed that it was in another place in the library,
and an old assistant stated that a generation back it had been moved
from its former place (as stated by the visitor), where it had been
previously located for very many years. An examination of the volume
showed a perfect correspondence in every detail with the description of
the strange visitor.

And so the story proceeds. Reference to the many works written on the
subject of the future life of the soul will supply many more instances
of the glimpses of recollection of past incarnations. But why spread
these instances over more pages? The experience of other people, while
of scientific interest and value as affording a basis for a theory or
doctrine, will never supply the experience that the close and rigid
investigator demands. Only his own experiences will satisfy him--and
perhaps not even those, for he may consider them delusions. These
experiences of others have their principal value as corroborative proofs
of one's own experiences, and thus serve to prove that the individual
experience was not abnormal, unusual, or a delusion. To those who have
not had these glimpses of recollection, the only proof that can be
offered is the usual arguments in favor of the doctrine, and the account
of the experiences of others--this may satisfy, and may not. But to
those who have had these glimpses--particularly in a marked
degree--there will come a feeling of