these times, the great intellectual
support of false doctrines and bad institutions. By the aid of this
theory every inveterate belief and every intense feeling of which the
origin is not remembered, is enabled to dispense with the obligation of
justifying itself by reason, and is erected into its own all-sufficient
voucher and justification. There never was an instrument better devised
for consecrating all deep-seated prejudices. And the chief strength of
this false philosophy in morals, politics, and religion, lies in the
appeal which it is accustomed to make to the evidence of mathematics
and of the cognate branches of physical science. To expel it from these
is to drive it from its stronghold.... In attempting to clear up the
real nature of the evidence of mathematical and physical truth, the
_System of Logic_ met the intuitive philosophers on ground on which they
had previously been deemed unassailable; and gave its own explanation
from experience and association of that peculiar character of what are
called necessary truths, which is adduced as proof that their evidence
must come from a deeper source than experience. Whether this has been
done effectually is still _sub judice_; and even then, to deprive a mode
of thought so strongly rooted in human prejudices and partialities of
its mere speculative support, goes but a very little way towards
overcoming it; but though only a step, it is a quite indispensable one;
for since, after all, prejudice can only be successfully combated by
philosophy, no way can really be made against it permanently, until it
has been shown not to have philosophy on its side' (pp. 225-227).
This was to lay the basis of a true positivism by the only means through
which it can be laid firmly. It was to establish at the bottom of men's
minds the habit of seeking explanations of all phenomena in experience,
and building up from the beginning the great positive principle that we
can only know phenomena, and can only know them experientially. We see,
from such passages as the two that have been quoted, that with Mr. Mill,
no less than with Comte, the ultimate object was to bring people to
extend positive modes of thinking to the master subjects of morals,
politics, and religion. Mr. Mill, however, with a wisdom which Comte
unfortunately did not share, refrained from any rash and premature
attempt to decide what would be the results of this much-needed
extension. He knew that we were as yet only
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