n-Hollweg
strenuously opposed the plan to sink the Lusitania. That is, he
opposed it up to a point. The advertisement from the German
Embassy at Washington which appeared in American newspapers warning
Americans could not have appeared without his sanction. In the
last days of July, 1914, backed by the Kaiser, he had opposed the
mobilisation order sufficient to cause a three days' delay--which
his military opponents in German politics claim was the chief cause
of the failure to take Paris--but in the case of the Lusitania he
was even more powerless against rampant militarism.

For nearly a year after the colossal blunder of the Lusitania,
there existed in the deep undercurrents of German politics a most
remarkable whirlpool of discord, in which the policy of von Tirpitz
was a severe tax on the patience of von Bethmann-Hollweg and the
Foreign Office, for it was they who had to invent all sorts of
plausible excuses to placate various neutral Powers.

The Kaiser after disastrously meddling with the General Staff
during the first month of the war, subsequently took no active hand
in military, naval and political policies unless conflicts between
his chosen chieftains forced him to do so.

One striking instance of this occurred when the Wilhelmstrasse
discovered that Washington was in possession of information in the
"_Arabic_ incident" which made the official excuses palpably too
thin. After the German authorities became convinced that their
failure to guarantee that unresisting merchantmen would not be sunk
until passengers and crew were removed to a place of safety would
cause a break with the United States, Tirpitz asserted that the
disadvantages to Germany from America as an enemy would be slight
in comparison with the advantages from the relentless submarining
which in his opinion would defeat Britain. He therefore advocated
that no concessions be made to Washington. Von Bethmann-Hollweg
was of the opposite opinion. A deadlock resulted, which was broken
when the Kaiser summoned both men to separate and secret
conferences. He decided in favour of the Chancellor, whereupon
Washington received the famous "_Arabic_ Guarantees." It is highly
significant that these were never made known to the German people.

Then followed six months of "frightfulness," broken pledges, notes,
crises, semi-crises, and finally the great crisis _de luxe_ in the
case of the _Sussex_. When, a few days after my return to England
fr