llicles; how he
tolerated his wife, and how he tolerated his son who attempted to
confute him and to cavil with him. For he remembered well that no man
has in his power another man's ruling principle. He wished therefore for
nothing else than that which was his own. And what is this? Not that
this or that man may act according to nature, for that is a thing which
belongs to another; but that while others are doing their own acts, as
they choose, he may nevertheless be in a condition conformable to nature
and live in it, only doing what is his own to the end that others also
may be in a state conformable to nature. For this is the object always
set before him by the wise and good man. Is it to be commander (a
praetor) of an army? No; but if it is permitted him, his object is in
this matter to maintain his own ruling principle. Is it to marry? No;
but if marriage is allowed to him, in this matter his object is to
maintain himself in a condition conformable to nature. But if he would
have his son not to do wrong or his wife, he would have what belongs to
another not to belong to another: and to be instructed is this, to learn
what things are a man's own and what belongs to another.

How then is there left any place for fighting (quarrelling) to a man who
has this opinion (which he ought to have)? Is he surprised at any thing
which happens, and does it appear new to him? Does he not expect that
which comes from the bad to be worse and more grievous than that what
actually befalls him? And does he not reckon as pure gain whatever they
(the bad) may do which falls short of extreme wickedness? Such a person
has reviled you. Great thanks to him for not having struck you. But he
has struck me also. Great thanks that he did not wound you. But he
wounded me also. Great thanks that he did not kill you. For when did he
learn or in what school that man is a tame animal, that men love one
another, that an act of injustice is a great harm to him who does it.
Since then he has not learned this and is not convinced of it, why shall
he not follow that which seems to be for his own interest? Your neighbor
has thrown stones. Have you then done anything wrong? But the things in
the house have been broken. Are you then a utensil? No; but a free power
of will. What then is given to you (to do) in answer to this? If you are
like a wolf, you must bite in return, and throw more stones. But, if you
consider what is proper for a man, examine your st