native of bringing only a small portion of
the trade under convoy by taking all the available fast small craft from
patrol duty and utilizing them to escort this portion of the trade, but
it was felt that as this would leave the _whole_ of the remaining trade
entirely without protection, and no fast patrol craft would be on the
trade routes to pick up the crews of any merchant ships that might be
sunk by submarines, the step was not justified.

The next point for consideration was the possibility of obtaining
destroyers or sloops from other sources with which to increase the
forces for trade protection. The only commands on which it was possible
to draw further were the Grand Fleet, the Harwich and Dover forces, the
destroyers of old types working on the East Coast, or the destroyers and
"P" boats protecting our cross-Channel communications west of the Dover
Command.

It was out of the question to reduce the Harwich or Dover flotillas
materially, as we were already running the gravest risks from the
inadequacy of these forces to deal with enemy destroyers and submarines
operating in southern waters from Zeebrugge or from German ports, and in
addition the Harwich Force furnished the sole protection for the weekly
convoy running between the Thames and Dutch ports, besides being much
required for reconnaissance and offensive operations in the Heligoland
Bight so far as it could be spared for this purpose. However, the
emergency was such that destroyers were taken from Harwich, as the force
obtained new vessels of a faster and more powerful type. The destroyers
on the East Coast and in the Portsmouth Command were already inadequate
to afford proper protection to the trade and the cross-Channel
communications, as evidenced by our losses. Here again, however, in
order to meet the very serious situation, some destroyers were
eventually transferred to Devonport from Portsmouth, but at the expense
of still less protection and fewer opportunities for offensive action
against submarines. There remained only the Grand Fleet destroyers on
which we could draw yet further. It had always been held that the Grand
Fleet required a total force of one hundred destroyers and ten flotilla
leaders for the double purpose of screening the ships from submarine
attack when at sea and of countering the enemy's destroyers and
attacking his heavy ships with torpedo fire in a fleet action. We had
gradually built the destroyer force of the Grand Flee