self. There are
numerous varieties of the drama, differing more or less widely from one
another, both as to the objects imitated and as to the means used in the
process. But they all agree in the _method_ or _manner_ which is
essential to the drama and to dramatic art, namely, _imitation in the
way of action_. The function of all Art being to give pleasure by
representation (see FINE ARTS), it is clear that what is distinctive of
any one branch or form must be the manner in which this function is
performed by it. In the epos, for instance, the method or manner is
narrative, and even when Odysseus tells of his action, he is not acting.

1. THEORY OF THE DRAMA, AND DRAMATIC ART

Origin of the drama.

The first step towards the drama is the assumption of character, whether
real or fictitious. It is caused by the desire, inseparable from human
nature, to give expression to feelings and ideas. These man expresses
not only by sound and gesture, like other animals, and by speech
significant by its delivery as well as by its purport, but also by
imitation superadded to these. To imitate, says Aristotle, is
instinctive in man from his infancy, and no pleasure is more universal
than that which is given by imitation. Inasmuch as the aid of some sort
of dress or decoration is usually at hand, while the accompaniment of
dance or song, or other music, naturally suggests itself, especially on
joyous or solemn occasions, we find that this preliminary step is taken
among all peoples, however primitive or remote. But it does not follow,
as is often assumed, that they possess a drama in germ. Boys playing at
soldiers, or men walking in a pageant--a shoemaker's holiday in ribbons
and flowers, or a Shetland sword-dance--none of these is in itself a
drama. This is not reached till the imitation or representation extends
to action.

Dramatic action.

An action which is to present itself as such to human minds must enable
them to recognize in it a procedure from cause to effect. This of course
means, neither that the cause suggested must be the final cause, nor
that the result shown forth need pretend to be the ultimate result. We
look upon an action as ended when the purpose with which it began is
shown to have been gained or frustrated; and we trace the beginning of
an action back to the human will that set it on foot--though this will
may be in bondage to a higher or stronger will, or to fate, in any or
all of its purposes. Wi