se, summarily punished a scurrilous personal attack on a
judge of assize with reference to his remarks in a concluded ease,
published immediately after the conclusion of the case (_R._ v. _Gray_,
1900, 2 Q.B. 36). The same measure may be meted out to those who publish
invectives against judges or juries with the object of creating
suspicion or contempt as to the administration of justice. But the
existence of this power does not militate against the right of the press
to publish full reports of trials and judgments or to make with
fairness, good faith, candour and decency, comments and criticisms on
what passed at the trial and on the correctness of the verdict or the
judgment. To impute corruption is said to go beyond the limits of fair
criticism. Shortt (_Law relating to Works of Literature_) states the law
to be that the temperate and respectful discussion of judicial
determination is not prohibited, but mere invective and abuse, and still
more the imputation of false, corrupt and dishonest motives is
punishable. In an information granted in 1788 against the corporation of
Yarmouth for having entered upon their books an order "stating that the
assembly were sensible that Mr W. (against whom an action had been
brought for malicious prosecution, and a verdict for L3000 returned,
which the court refused to disturb) was actuated by motives of public
justice, of preserving the rights of the corporation to their admiralty
jurisdiction, and of supporting the honour and credit of the chief
magistrate," Mr Justice Butler said, "The judge and jury who tried the
case, confirmed by the court of common pleas, have said that instead of
his having been actuated by motives of public justice, or by any motives
which should influence the actions of an honest man, he had been
actuated by malice. These opinions are not reconcilable; if the one be
right the other must be wrong. It is therefore a direct insinuation that
the court had judged wrong in all they have done in this case, and is
therefore clearly a libel on the administration of justice."

The exact limits of the power to punish for contempt of court in respect
of statements or comments on the action of judges and juries, or with
reference to _pending_ proceedings, have been the subject of some
controversy, owing to the difficulty of reconciling the claims of the
press to liberty and of the public to free discussion of the proceedings
of courts of justice with the claims of the j