than 180 miles from the
point of departure, and the whole fleet, or what was left of it, was
back in port within thirty-six hours of the time of leaving.
It has been surmised, and there is some reason to believe, that the
German plan was to force a passage for their battle cruisers through
the channel between Scotland and Norway into the open sea, where, with
their high-speed and long-range guns, they might, at least for a time,
have paralyzed transatlantic commerce with very serious results for
England's industries, and still more serious results for her supplies
of food.
Another and a somewhat more plausible theory is that the plan
contemplated the escape to the open sea, not of the battle cruisers
themselves, but of a number of very fast armed merchant cruisers of
the _Moewe_ type, which were to repeat the _Moewe's_ exploit on a
large scale, serving the same purpose that the submarines served
during the period of their greatest activity. Color is lent to this
theory by what is known of the controversy now going on in Germany
between those who advocate a renewal of the submarine warfare against
commerce, and those who are opposed to this. It is evident that if
fast cruisers could be maintained on England's trade routes they might
do all that the submarine could do and more, and this without raising
any question as to their rights under international law.
Whatever the plan was, we must assume that it was thwarted by the
interposition of the British fleet; and from this point of view the
battle takes on the aspect of a British victory. The German fleet is
back behind the fortifications and the mine fields of the Helgoland
Bight, in the waters which have been its refuge for nearly two years
of comparative inactivity. And the British fleet still holds the
command of the sea with a force which makes its command complete, and,
in all human probability, permanent.
From the narrower point of view of results on the actual field of
battle, it appears from the evidence at present available that,
although the Germans were first to withdraw, they had the advantage
in that they lost fewer ships than their opponents and less important
ones. This is not admitted by the British, and it may not be true, but
we have the positive assurance of the German Government that it is so,
and no real evidence to the contrary. It must therefore be accepted
for the present, always with remembrance of the fact that the first
reports given o
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