t possible to say with any confidence that he could have done
this if he had held off at a distance as great as prudence might have
suggested. Circumstances placed him in a position where it seemed to
him desirable to forget the distinction between his ships and
battleships, and this is exactly what he did.

Broadly speaking, it must be said that Beatty's course throughout the
day was, to quote the favorite expression of British writers on naval
matters, "in keeping with the best traditions of the service." And
while it was bold and dashing, it was entirely free from the rashness
which the British public has been a little inclined to attribute to
him since the Dogger Bank engagement.

The only further criticism of the conduct of the battle is that which
insists that the German fleet should not have been allowed to escape.
And here it is difficult to find an explanation which is at the same
time an excuse. Of the situation at 9 p. m. Admiral Jellicoe writes
that he had maneuvered into a very advantageous position, _in which
his fleet was interposed between the German fleet and the German
base_. He then goes on to say that the threat of destroyer attack
during the rapidly approaching darkness made it necessary to dispose
the fleet with a view to its safety, _while providing for a renewal of
the action at daylight_. Accordingly, he "maneuvered so as to remain
between the Germans and their base, placing flotillas of destroyers
where they could protect the fleet and attack the heavy German ships."

Admiral Beatty reported that he did not consider it desirable or
proper to engage the German battle fleet during the dark hours, _as
the strategical position made it appear certain he could locate them
at daylight under most favorable circumstances_.

Here, then, is the situation between nine and ten o'clock at night,
when the approach of darkness made it seem desirable to call a halt
for the night--a huge fleet, of more than thirty capital ships, was
interposed between the Germans and their base. The general position of
the Germans was known, and destroyers, of which the British had at
least seventy-five available, were so disposed as to keep in touch
with the Germans and attack them during the night. The German fleet
was slower than the British fleet by several knots, and if the
statements by Jellicoe and Beatty of the damage done are even
approximately true, Von Hipper and Von Scheer must have been
embarrassed by the necess