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of, several individuals. That can never be true of sensation. We can never tell whether our sensations are the same as those of other people--never at any rate by means of sensations themselves; never unless and until such sensations have been inter-related by some other instrument. A mere photographic reproduction of sensation is thus quite useless as a means of Knowledge. In some way or other general terms supply the common bond. The recognition of this fact was one of the great results of the Socratic discussion. This explains the immense importance which Socrates naturally attached to the criticism of general and abstract terms. * * * * * The work of Socrates in this direction was immediately taken up and carried much further by Plato. Plato maintained that these general and abstract terms were in truth the names of ideas (+eide+) with which the mind is naturally furnished, and further that these ideas corresponded to and typified the eternal forms of things--the essential constituents of the real world. Knowledge was possible because there were such eternal forms or ideal elements--the archetypes--of which the +eide+ were the counterparts and representations. Knowledge, Plato held, was concerned solely with these eternal forms, not with sensation at all. The sensible world was in a state of constant flux and could not be the object of true science. Its apprehension was effected by a faculty or capacity (_Republic_, v. 478-79) midway between Knowledge and nescience to which he applied the term +doxa+, frequently translated _opinion_, but which in this connection would be much more accurately rendered, _sensible impression_, or even perception. At any rate, the term _opinion_ is a very unhappy one, and does not convey the true meaning at all, for no voluntary intellective act on the part of the subject was implied by the term. Now intelligence in constructing a scheme of Knowledge is active. The ideas are the instruments of this activity. Plato's doctrine of ideas was probably designed or conceived by him as affording an explanation also of the community of Knowledge. He emphasised the fluent instability of the sensible impression, and as we have already pointed out, sensation in itself labours also under this drawback that it contains and affords no common nexus whereby the conceptions or perceptions of one man can be compared or related with those of another. Indeed, if E
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