rom ours, it is not for us to determine. But
to say or think there are no such, because we conceive nothing of them,
is no better an argument than if a blind man should be positive in it,
that there was no such thing as sight and colours, because he had no
manner of idea of any such thing, nor could by any means frame to
himself any notions about seeing. The ignorance and darkness that is in
us no more hinders nor confines the knowledge that is in others, than
the blindness of a mole is an argument against the quicksightedness of
an eagle. He that will consider the infinite power, wisdom, and goodness
of the Creator of all things will find reason to think it was not all
laid out upon so inconsiderable, mean, and impotent a creature as he
will find man to be; who in all probability is one of the lowest of
all intellectual beings. What faculties, therefore, other species of
creatures have to penetrate into the nature and inmost constitutions of
things; what ideas they may receive of them far different from ours, we
know not. This we know and certainly find, that we want several other
views of them besides those we have, to make discoveries of them more
perfect. And we may be convinced that the ideas we can attain to by
our faculties are very disproportionate to things themselves, when
a positive, clear, distinct one of substance itself, which is the
foundation of all the rest, is concealed from us. But want of ideas of
this kind, being a part as well as cause of our ignorance, cannot be
described. Only this I think I may confidently say of it, That the
intellectual and sensible world are in this perfectly alike: that that
part which we see of either of them holds no proportion with what we see
not; and whatsoever we can reach with our eyes or our thoughts of either
of them is but a point, almost nothing in comparison of the the rest.

24. Want of simple ideas that men are capable of having, but having
not,(1) Because their remoteness, or,

Secondly, Another great cause of ignorance is the want of ideas we are
capable of. As the want of ideas which our faculties are not able
to give us shuts us wholly from those views of things which it is
reasonable to think other beings, perfecter than we, have, of which we
know nothing; so the want of ideas I now speak of keeps us in ignorance
of things we conceive capable of being known to us. Bulk, figure, and
motion we have ideas of. But though we are not without ideas of these
pr