positions to be treated of more at large.

But because words are looked on as the great conduits of truth and
knowledge, and that in conveying and receiving of truth, and commonly in
reasoning about it, we make use of words and propositions, I shall more
at large inquire wherein the certainty of real truths contained in
propositions consists, and where it is to be had; and endeavour to show
in what sort of universal propositions we are capable of being certain
of their real truth or falsehood.

I shall begin with GENERAL propositions, as those which most employ our
thoughts, and exercise our contemplation. General truths are most looked
after by the mind as those that most enlarge our knowledge; and by their
comprehensiveness satisfying us at once of many particulars, enlarge our
view, and shorten our way to knowledge.

11. Moral and Metaphysical Truth.

Besides truth taken in the strict sense before mentioned, there are
other sorts of truths: As, 1. Moral truth, which is speaking of things
according to the persuasion of our own minds, though the proposition we
speak agree not to the reality of things; 2. Metaphysical truth, which
is nothing but the real existence of things, conformable to the ideas to
which we have annexed their names. This, though it seems to consist in
the very beings of things, yet, when considered a little nearly, will
appear to include a tacit proposition, whereby the mind joins that
particular thing to the idea it had before settled with the name to
it. But these considerations of truth, either having been before taken
notice of, or not being much to our present purpose, it may suffice here
only to have mentioned them.

CHAPTER VI. OF UNIVERSAL PROPOSITIONS: THEIR TRUTH AND CERTAINTY.

1. Treating of Words necessary to Knowledge.

THOUGH the examining and judging of ideas by themselves, their names
being quite laid aside, be the best and surest way to clear and distinct
knowledge: yet, through the prevailing custom of using sounds for ideas,
I think it is very seldom practised. Every one may observe how common it
is for names to be made use of, instead of the ideas themselves, even
when men think and reason within their own breasts; especially if the
ideas be very complex, and made up of a great collection of simple ones.
This makes the consideration of WORDS and PROPOSITIONS so necessary
a part of the Treatise of Knowledge, that it is very hard to speak
intelligibly of the one,