d there are some few points of possible
disagreement. Of the latter the principal ones upon which Hooker's
formal apologists rely, are the destruction of the Eleventh Corps
through Howard's alleged carelessness, and the failure of Sedgwick
to perform the herculean task assigned to him in coming to Hooker's
support. Allowing, for the moment, that Howard and Sedgwick were
entirely at fault, and eliminating these two questions entirely from the
issue, let us see what Hooker himself did, bearing in mind that he has
officially acknowledged that he knew, substantially, the number of Lee's
army, and bearing also in mind that the following are facts which can
be disputed only by denying the truth and accuracy of all the reports,
Federal and Confederate, taken as a body; and these happen to dovetail
into each other in one so consistent whole, that they leave to the
careful student none but entirely insignificant items open to doubt.

From Saturday at 8 A.M. till Sunday noon, some twenty-eight hours,
Hooker with seventy-five thousand, and, after the arrival of the First
Corps, nearly ninety thousand men, lay between the separated wings
of Lee's army of twenty-four thousand and seventeen thousand men
respectively, being all the while cognizant of the facts. Had ever a
general a better chance to whip his enemy in detail? And yet we were
badly beaten in this fight. Now, if loyalty to Hooker requires us to
believe that his conduct of this campaign was even respectable, it
follows that the Army of the Potomac, respectably led, could be defeated
by the Army of Northern Virginia, two to one. Will the soldiers of the
ever-faithful army accept this as an explanation of our defeat?

Again: from Sunday noon till Monday at 9 A.M., twenty-one hours, Hooker,
with over eighty thousand men, was held in the White House lines by
a force of twenty-seven thousand. If loyalty to Hooker requires us to
believe that this was even respectable generalship, it follows that the
Army of the Potomac, well led, could be defeated by the Army of Northern
Virginia, three to one. Shall we accept this as an explanation of our
defeat?

Again: from Monday at 9 A.M. till Tuesday at 4 P.M., thirty-one hours,
against the advice of all his corps commanders except Sickles and Couch
(the latter agreeing to retreat only because he felt that the army would
be defeated under Hooker whatever they might do), Hooker, with eighty
thousand men, was held in the White House lines