k's engagement with the enemy?
Answer.--I have no means of knowing; at the time we were ordered to
re-cross the river, so far as I could judge of the temper and spirit of
the officers and men of the army, they were ready to take the offensive.
I do not know why we were withdrawn then; I think we should not have
withdrawn. I think the enemy were whipped; although they had gained
certain advantages, they were so severely handled that they were weaker
than we were."

"Question.--Is it your opinion as a military man, that, if our army had
been ordered to take the offensive vigorously, we would have gained a
victory there? Answer.--I think we should have taken the offensive when
the enemy attacked Gen. Sedgwick."

Again Hooker: "During the 3d and 4th, reconnoissances were made on the
right," (i. e., at Chancellorsville,) "from one end of the line to the
other, to feel the enemy's strength, and find a way and place to attack
him successfully; but it was ascertained that it could only be made on
him behind his defences, and with slender columns, which I believed
he could destroy as fast as they could be thrown on to his works.
Subsequent campaigns have only confirmed the opinion I then
ascertained."

Now, Hooker, at the time of giving this testimony, (March 11, 1865), had
had nearly two years in which to become familiar with the true state
of facts. He must have known these facts from the reports of his
subordinates, if not from the accounts of the action in the Southern
press. He must have known that all day Monday, he had only Jackson's
corps opposed to him. He must have known that these troops had time
enough to erect none but very ordinary intrenchments. And yet he excuses
himself from not attacking his opponents, when he outnumbered them four
to one. Would not his testimony tell better for him, if he had said that
at the time he supposed he had more than eighteen thousand men before
him? It is a thankless task to pursue criticism upon such capricious and
revocatory evidence.

Sickles also, in his testimony, states that from our new lines we felt
the enemy everywhere in his front, and that Gen. Griffin with his entire
division made a reconnoissance, and developed the enemy in great force
on our right flank. This work of reconnoitring can scarcely have been
done with great thoroughness, for we know to a certainty what force
Lee left behind. It would be well to say little about it. But it is
not strange that the purpose