icer
ever made a greater mistake in construing his orders, and no one ever
accomplished less in so doing. The effect of throwing his body of
cavalry in the rear of the enemy, and on his communications, at the
time it was in his power to have done it, can readily be estimated. But
instead, that important arm of the army became crippled to an extent
which seriously embarrassed me in my subsequent operations. Soon after,
Gen. Stoneman applied for and obtained a sick-leave; and I requested
that it might be indefinitely extended to him. It is charitable to
suppose that Gens. Stoneman and Averell did not read their orders, and
determined to carry on operations in conformity with their own views and
inclinations."

XXXVI. HOOKER'S RESUME OF THE CAMPAIGN.

Nearly two years after this campaign, in his testimony before the
Committee on the Conduct of the War, Hooker thus speaks about the
general result of the movement:--

"I may say here, the battle of Chancellorsville has been associated with
the battle of Fredericksburg, and has been called a disaster. My whole
loss in the battle of Chancellorsville was a little over seventeen
thousand."

"I said that Chancellorsville had been called a disaster. I lost under
those operations, one piece artillery, I think five or six wagons, and
one ambulance." "In my opinion, there is nothing to regret in regard to
Chancellorsville, except to accomplish all I moved to accomplish. The
troops lost no honor, except one corps, and we lost no more men than
the enemy; but expectation was high, the army in splendid condition,
and great results were expected from it. It was at a time, too, when the
nation required a victory." "I would like to speak somewhat further of
this matter of Chancellorsville. It has been the desire and aim of
some of Gen. McClellan's admirers, and I do not know but of others, to
circulate erroneous impressions in regard to it. When I returned from
Chancellorsville, I felt that I had fought no battle; in fact, I had
more men than I could use; and I fought no general battle, for the
reason that I could not get my men in position to do so; probably not
more than three or three and a half corps, on the right, were engaged in
that fight."

And he repeats his understanding of his manoeuvring as follows: "My
impression was, that Lee would have been compelled to move out on the
same road that Jackson had moved on, and pass over to my right. I should
add in my testimony t