ow demanded Lee's undivided skill. This was properly the
left wing of the army, which, under Sedgwick, had made the demonstration
below Fredericksburg, to enable the right wing, under Hooker, to cross
the river above, and establish itself at Chancellorsville. It had
consisted of three corps; but, so soon as the demonstration had effected
its purpose, it will be remembered that Hooker withdrew from Sedgwick's
command both the First and Third Corps, leaving him with his own, the
Sixth, to guard the crossings of the river; while Gibbon's division
of the Second Corps did provost duty at the camp at Falmouth, and held
itself in readiness to move in any direction at a moment's notice.

From this time on, the Sixth Corps may be more properly considered as a
detached command, than as the left wing of the Army of the Potomac.

And, beyond some demonstrations in aid of Hooker's manoeuvring, Sedgwick
had been called on to perform no actual service up to the evening of May
2.

On May 1, a demonstration in support of Hooker's advance from
Chancellorsville had been ordered, and speedily countermanded, on
account of the despatch having reached Sedgwick later than the hour set
for his advance.

On the forenoon of May 2, Hooker had given Sedgwick discretionary
instructions to attack the enemy in his front, "if an opportunity
presents itself with a reasonable expectation of success."

Then came the despatch of 4.10 P.M., May 2, already quoted, and received
by Sedgwick just before dark:--

"The general commanding directs that Gen. Sedgwick cross the river as
soon as indications will permit; capture Fredericksburg with every thing
in it, and vigorously pursue the enemy. We know the enemy is flying,
trying to save his trains: two of Sickles's divisions are among them."

This despatch was immediately followed by another: "The major-general
commanding directs you to pursue the enemy by the Bowling-Green road."

In pursuance of these and previous orders, Sedgwick transferred the
balance of the Sixth Corps to the south side of the Rappahannock, one
division being already there to guard the bridge-head. Sedgwick's orders
of May 1 contemplated the removal of the pontoons before his advance on
the Bowling-Green road, as he would be able to leave no sufficient force
to guard them. But these orders were received so late as daylight on the
2d; and the withdrawal of the bridges could not well be accomplished in
the full view of the enemy, with