vote, and once more Gracchus interceded with
his old friend. But he spoke to deaf ears. The voting went on, and
when Octavius, on his Tribunate being taken from him, would not go
away, Plutarch says that Tiberius ordered one of his freedmen to drag
him from the Rostra.

These acts of Tiberius Gracchus are commonly said to have been the
beginning of revolution at Rome; and the guilt of it is accordingly
laid at his door. And there can be no doubt that he was guilty in the
sense that a man is guilty who introduces a light into some chamber
filled with explosive vapour, which the stupidity or malice of others
has suffered to accumulate. But, after all, too much is made of this
violation of constitutional forms and the sanctity of the Tribunate.
[Sidenote: Defence of the conduct of Gracchus.] The first were effete,
and all regular means of renovating the Republic seemed to be closed
to the despairing patriot, by stolid obstinacy sheltering itself
under the garb of law and order. The second was no longer what it had
been--the recognised refuge and defence of the poor. The rich, as
Tiberius in effect argued, had found out how to use it also. If all
men who set the example of forcible infringement of law are criminals,
Gracchus was a criminal. But in the world's annals he sins in good
company; and when men condemn him, they should condemn Washington
also. Perhaps his failure has had most to do with his condemnation.
Success justifies, failure condemns, most revolutions in most men's
eyes. But if ever a revolution was excusable this was; for it
was carried not by a small party for small aims, but by national
acclamation, by the voices of Italians who flocked to Rome either to
vote, or, if they had not votes themselves, to overawe those who had.
How far Gracchus saw the inevitable effect of his acts is open to
dispute. [Sidenote: Gracchus not a weak sentimentalist.] But probably
he saw it as clearly as any man can see the future. Because he was
generous and enthusiastic, it is assumed that he was sentimental and
weak, and that his policy was guided by impulse rather than reason.
There seems little to sustain such a judgment other than the desire of
writers to emphasise a comparison between him and his brother. If
his character had been what some say that it was, his speeches would
hardly have been described by Cicero as acute and sensible, but not
rhetorical enough. All his conduct was consistent. He strove hard
and to the last